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Essay
Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment,
and the Supreme Court as Super-Legislature
BRIAN LEITER*

I propose to defend and explore three claims in this Essay. First,
there is very little actual "law" in federal constitutional law in the United
States, especially with respect to cases that end up at the Supreme Court.
There, the Court operates as a kind of super-legislature, albeit one with
limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is limited in two important ways:
first, the Court can only pass on issues that are brought before it; and
second, the Court is constrained, to some extent, by its past decisions and
by constitutional and legislative texts. The problem, however, is that
those constraints underdetermine the Court's decisions in most cases, so
the Court essentially makes its final choice among the legally viable
options based on the moral and political values of the Justices, and not
simply on the basis of legally binding standards. The latter claim is, in
part, a jurisprudential thesis about what constitutes "legally binding
standards." I shall defend the first claim by reference to the most
plausible account of the nature of law-the legal positivist theory
developed by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz.
Second, the absence of law in so many parts of federal constitutional
law means that the quality of moral and political judgment exercised by
judges is of decisive importance in how they fulfill their role. Thus, it
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy,
& Human Values, University of Chicago. An earlier version of this lecture was presented as the 24th
Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture in Constitutional Law at University of California Hastings
College of the Law in San Francisco on January 12, 2015. I am grateful to Aziz Huq and Nicholas
Stephanopoulos for very helpful and detailed comments on an earlier draft; to Will Baude for
additional feedback on that draft; to Mike Seidman for shrewd and illuminating advice on the
penultimate draft; and to Phil Smoke, University of Chicago Law School Class of 2015 for excellent
research assistance. Finally, my thanks to the audience at the Tobrine Lecture, and especially to Judge
Joseph Grodin for a helpful correspondence afterwards.
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should be the overriding factor in the appointment of federal appellate
judges, especially Supreme Court Justices. That brings me to my third
claim, namely, that all political actors know that the Supreme Court
often operates as a super-legislature, and thus that the moral and
political views of the Justices are decisive criteria for their appointment.
This almost banal truth is, however, rarely discussed in the public
confirmation process, but is common knowledge among political and
legal insiders. To be sure, there is always media speculation about the
political predilections of the nominees, but their actual moral and
political views are treated as off limits in the real confirmation process.
This antidemocratic secrecy is, in my view, deeply wrong and must be
replaced with a realistic acknowledgment of the role of the Supreme
Court as a political actor of limited jurisdiction. I will illustrate these
claims by discussing a number of important public law cases, recent and
not-so-recent.
What does it mean to say there is very little "law" in American
constitutional law? That requires us to have some view about what it
means to say law exists, and so I must begin with some discussion of basic
jurisprudential questions. To that end, I will follow the most promising
theory about the nature of law: the legal positivism of H.L.A. Hart and
his student Joseph Raz.' Let us start with some terminology. Human
societies are awash in norms, by which I mean demands of the form,
"You ought to do X,",or "You ought not do Y." 2 Some norms are merely
norms of etiquette: for example, "You ought not talk on your cell phone
during the lecture" or "You ought not talk with your mouth full at the
table." Others are norms of prudence or self-interest: "You ought to
attend class, lest you fail the exam!" Some are moral norms: "You ought
to consider how your actions will affect the well-being of others." And
some are norms of the legal system, for example, "You ought not go
faster than fifty-five miles per hour on the highway." The categories are
not mutually exclusive: sometimes moral norms such as, "You ought not
murder innocents," are also legal norms, and sometimes norms of
prudence are too, as in, "You must wear a seatbelt while driving." Norms
of etiquette are rarely legal norms, many moral norms are not legal ones,
and many legal norms are not ones we think of as representing moral or
ethical obligations. For instance, we do not think the English are
immoral for driving on the left of the road rather than the right, but we
recognize they have a legal obligation to do so. The jurisprudential
question is: how do we mark the difference? And the legal positivist
answer is: norms are legally valid-that is, norms of the legal system-in
i. See Brian Leiter, The Case for Legal Positivism as an Account of the Artefact Law, in LAW AS
(L. Barazin & K. Himma eds.) (forthcoming 2016), for a discussion on legal positivism.
2. There are many other kinds of norms, including permissions such as "You may do X." I use
deontic norms as the central case.
AN ARTIFACT
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virtue of satisfying criteria in that system's "rule of recognition" as Hart
called it.' A rule of recognition specifies the criteria in virtue of which
particular norms are taken to be norms of the legal system. Such criteria
can include legislative enactment, executive orders, judicial decisions,
and so on.
Rules of recognition in modern legal systems are, admittedly,
complex. Consider: a norm is a valid norm of the California legal system
if it has been enacted by the California legislature and signed by the
Governor, and has not been deemed unconstitutional as a matter of state
or federal law by a state or federal court and has not been preempted by
a constitutional federal law; a norm can also be a valid norm in the
California system if it has been enacted by Congress and signed by the
President, and has not been deemed unconstitutional by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit or by the Supreme Court; a norm can also
be a legally valid norm in the California legal system if it figures in the
holding of a California court that has not been reversed by a higher
California or federal court; and so on. This omits executive orders and
administrative rulings, also subject to various kinds of judicial review.
A good part of legal education is education in the rule of
recognition of one's legal system, although it is rarely denominated as
such in the law school classroom. But what makes it the case that
California's rule of recognition is what it is? Hart's great insight was that,
at bottom, legal systems rest upon nothing more than a conventional
practice of officials, notably judges. The California Constitution is a
binding norm of the California legal system only because judges in
California treat it as binding on their decisions; so too with the Federal
Constitution, and so too with legislative enactments, administrative
decisions, and the like. That a rule of recognition exists, and that it has
the particular content it does, depends entirely on officials converging on
certain criteria of legal validity and on their treating such criteria as
obligatory or binding-accepting them from an "internal point of view"
as Hart famously said.4 That the officials converge on certain criteria is
an empirical question, manifest in their decisions and sometimes the
reasons given for them; that they treat such criteria as obligatory is
manifest in their language and their behavior: for example, in their
willingness to criticize other judges who depart from those criteria, and in
the language they use to justify their own conduct.
A wonderful example of Hart's point comes from the case of Chief
Justice Roy Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court, who, in 2003,
refused to abide by a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit holding that the presence of a statue of the Ten Commandments

3. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (3d ed. 2012).
4. See id. at 90-92.
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in the Alabama Supreme Court building violated the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution.' There was no doubt that under the
applicable rule of recognition, the Eleventh Circuit had authority over
Chief Justice Moore with regard to the constitutionality of the placement
of that statue. And when Chief Justice Moore defied the Eleventh
Circuit's decision, the officials of the Alabama legal system made manifest
their acceptance of this aspect of the rule of recognition from an internal
point of view. They not only criticized Chief Justice Moore's refusal to
comply with the order, but they convened the necessary procedures to
remove him from office.6
We may imagine a more fanciful example to illustrate Hart's view
that where a rule of recognition exists, officials of the system accept that
rule from an internal point of view-that is, they treat it as obligatory.
Suppose Chief Justice Roberts comes to UC Hastings, and a student
asks, "Justice Roberts, why are you and the other Justices always worried
about whether laws are constitutional? I mean, who cares? Why not just
make a sensible decision?" Once he gets past being surprised, the Chief
Justice, we can be sure, would not give the following answer: "I'll tell you
why we're always talking about the Constitution: being Chief Justice is a
great job, it's got prestige, lifetime tenure, a great pension too. If I didn't
treat the Constitution as a constraint on what we do, I'm worried I'd get
impeached and have to give up this wonderful sinecure I have." Instead
of averting to crass self-interested reasons like these for taking the
Constitution seriously, the Chief Justice is far more likely to appeal to the
professional oath of office he took as a Justice to uphold the Constitution, as
well as to the moral and political virtues of our constitutional system as he
understands them. I want to be clear: I am quite sure those are the actual
reasons the Chief Justice, like other justices and judges, take the
constitutionality of statutes seriously. Where legal systems exist, officials
of the system, including the judges, really do accept the criteria of legal
validity, such as constitutionality, from an internal point of view.
But this now brings us back to the problem with which we started.
Constitutionality is only a criterion of legal validity in the rule of
recognition of the American legal system if judges generally treat it as
such and accept it from an internal point of view. The difficulty is that,
while all judges treat the constitutional document as legally binding, they
differ wildly on how to ascertain the meaning of its provisions. Justice
Scalia, for example, thinks the original public meaning of the provisions
5. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1282 (Ith Cir. 2003).
6. Jeffrey Gettleman, Court Orders Alabama's Chief Justice Removed from Bench, N.Y. TIMES,
(Nov. 13, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2oo3/1I/I3/national/I3CND-JUDG.html. Chief Justice Moore
was subsequently reelected, which, alas, says more about the Alabama electorate than about the officials
of the legal system, who acted appropriately. See Brianne Britzius, Roy Moore Elected New Alabama
Chief Justice, WSFAI2 (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.wsfa.com/story/20025oo4/roy-moore-elected-newalabama-chief-justice.
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of the Constitution determines its requirements; Justice Thomas
sometimes agrees with him, but no one else does.' As a matter of the rule
of recognition of American constitutional law, it is obviously false that
the original public meaning of the Constitution is what is legally binding
on the courts.8 Some judges treat the plain meaning as binding, some
appeal to the structure of the Constitution, and almost all defer to past
judicial interpretations of constitutional provisions (whether based on
original meaning or not) as binding-an example of what my colleague
David Strauss calls our "constitutional common law."9 Since federal

judges do not converge on a single way of fixing constitutional meaning,
it follows, on the positivist view, that in large parts of so-called
"constitutional law" there really is no law because there are no criteria of
legal validity generally accepted and applied by judges."
Not all areas of what we call constitutional law are so unsettledunanimous decisions by the Supreme Court on many constitutional
issues are rather good evidence in support of that point. But even divided
decisions can turn out to be widely accepted as settled. Let us recall the
1989 case Texas v. Johnson," in which the Supreme Court decided that a
law prohibiting desecration of the flag violated the First Amendment, a
decision in which Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the majority
opinion by Justice Brennan. Twenty-five years later, the case stands as
good law: the government cannot, constitutionally, punish burning the
American flag. Lower court judges understand that a Supreme Court
decision like Johnson binds them to invalidate any blanket ban on flag
burning, and thus the issue has hardly arisen since.
Then, however, we have an issue like whether the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to own guns. For most of the
twentieth century, it was settled law that it does not. After all, the
Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed."' 2 One natural reading, one that dominated for
most of our constitutional history, was that this protected the right of
states to arm their militias. That the Amendment really protects an
individual right to bear arms was famously deemed a "fraud on the
7. Other J'stices will avert to originalist considerations but do not regard them as decisive the
way Justice Scalia purports to do.
8. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., ConstitutionalPrecedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence,86 N.C. L. REV. 1107 (2008).
9. See David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 929

(1996). In the lower federal courts, something like the "common law constitutionalism" approach
dominates due to convergence among officials on the binding force of Supreme Court decisions. But
even then, there remains plenty of room for the exercise of quasi-legislative powers.
io. See Brian Leiter, Explaining Theoretical Disagreement,76 U. CI.L. REv. 1215, 1224-32 (2009),
for a discussion of how this extends beyond constitutional law in some measure in the United States.
II. 491 U.S. 397 (989).
T2. IPS C0N1T. amend. II.
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American public" by the late Chief Justice Warren Burger, a Republican
appointee.'3 That "fraud" is now the law of the land, thanks to a 2008
decision by the super-legislature in District of Columbia v. Heller,4 which
bypassed precedent and received the original public meaning as read by
Justice Scalia in the majority and disputed at length by Justice Stevens in
the dissent. The historical evidence is obviously mixed, and my colleague
Judge Richard Posner's verdict on the decision, in a well-known New
Republic article at the time, still seems apt:
Lawyers are advocates for their clients, and judges are advocates for
whichever side of the case they have decided to vote for. The judge
sends his law clerks scurrying to the library and to the Web for bits and
pieces of historical documentation. When the clerks are the numerous
and able clerks of Supreme Court justices, enjoying the assistance of
the capable staffs of the Supreme Court library and the Library of
Congress, and when dozens and sometimes hundreds of amicus curiae
briefs have been filed, many bulked out with the fruits of their authors'
own law-office historiography, it is a simple matter, especially for a
skillful rhetorician such as Scalia, to write a plausible historical defense
of his position.
But it was not so simple in Heller, and Scalia and his staff labored
mightily to produce a long opinion (the majority opinion is almost

25,000 words long) that would convince, or perhaps just overwhelm,

the doubters. The range of historical references in the majority opinion
is breathtaking, but it is not evidence of disinterested historical inquiry.
It is evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to produce snow jobs.
For more than two centuries, the "right" to private possession of guns,
supposedly created by the Second Amendment, had lain dormant.
Constitutional rights often lie dormant, spectral subjects of theoretical
speculation, until some change in the social environment creates a
demand for their vivification and enforcement. But nothing has changed
in the social environment to justify giving the Second Amendment a new
life discontinuous with its old one: a new wine in a decidedly old
wineskin. There is no greater urgency about allowing people to possess
guns for self-defense or defense of property today than there was thirty
years ago, when the prevalence of violent crime was greater, or for that
matter one hundred years ago. Only the membership of the Supreme
Court has changed.
If constitutional decisions are to be determined by the balance between
liberals and conservatives on the Supreme Court, the fig-leafing that
we find in Heller-the historicizing glaze on personal values and policy
preferences-will continue to be irresistibly tempting to the justices,
with their large and tireless staffs and their commitment to a mystique of
"objective" interpretation. There is no way to purge political principles
from constitutional decision-making, but they do not have to be liberal
or conservative principles. A preference for judicial modesty-for less
interference by the Supreme Court with the other branches of

13. The MacNeiL/LehrerNewsHour: FirstFreedoms (PBS television broadcast Dec. 6, I99I).
14. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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government-cannot be derived by some logical process from
constitutional text or history. It would have to be imposed. It would be
a discretionary choice by the justices. But judging from Heller,it would
be a wise choice. It would go some distance toward de-politicizing the
Supreme Court. It would lower the temperature of judicial confirmation
hearings, widen the field of selection of justices, and enable the Supreme
Court to attend to the many important non-constitutional issues that it
is inclined to neglect. 5
A preference for judicial modesty is, however, also a political choice, 6 as
Judge Posner recognizes, one that will serve to immunize from judicial
review whatever the prevailing ideology of the other branches of the
government is at that time. So the real question is why, when we confirm
Justices to the super-legislature, do we not have a public discussion of their
political principles? That is the question Judge Posner's apt critique raises.
The Supreme Court's role as super-legislature emerges in the recent
voting rights case, Shelby County v. Holder.7 Here, a bare majority of the
super-legislature invalidated section 4 of the Voting Rights Act that the
actual legislature, that is, Congress, had evaluated and extended in 2oo6.8
The Shelby County decision did so based on the finding of five members
of the super-legislature that section 4-which specified the formula for
determining which states with a history of voting discrimination required
federal preapproval for election law changes-is no longer necessary,
contrary to the view, apparently, of the actual legislature seven years
earlier. 9 In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the five super-legislators
explained that while "Congress compiled thousands of pages of evidence
before reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act," these did not justify the
original 1965 formula for preclearance." Why not? According to Chief
Justice Roberts, there was "no logical relation" to the section 4
requirements, that these requirements were "irrational" given the record,
indeed, "played no role" in the preclearance formulas." This is all just
rhetorical flourish, of course, for a different legislative judgment: it is
obviously not irrational to rectify a wrong with a possibly over inclusive
measure when the wrong is sufficiently serious that one wants to secure
its elimination. As Justice Ginsburg, for the dissenters, observed:
15. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 35.

16. There is ambiguity in the notion of a "political" choice, though the basic idea is that it is a
choice motivated by adherence to a norm that has no legal status but instead reflects commitments for
how the polity as a whole should be organized-such norms may run the gamut from partisanship for
the narrow agenda of a particular party to a vision of the just society.
I7. 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013).

18. Note that the fundamental question in Shelby County was a constitutional, not statutory, one;
namely, was section 4 a constitutional (that is, rational) exercise of Congressional power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments (including, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments) to the
Constitution?
i9. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629.
20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 2629-31.
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Congress determined, based on a voluminous record, that the scourge of
discrimination was not yet extirpated. The question this case presents is
who decides whether, as currently operative, [pre-clearance in
accordance with the section 4 formula] remains justifiable, this Court,
or a Congress charged with the obligation to enforce the post-Civil War
Amendments "by appropriate legislation." With overwhelming support
in both Houses, Congress concluded that, for two prime reasons, [the
preclearance formula] should continue in force, unabated. First,
continuance would facilitate completion of the impressive gains thus
far made; and second, continuance would guard against backsliding.
Those assessments were well within Congress' province to make and
should elicit this Court's unstinting approbation."
Alas, a majority of the super-legislature did not offer approbation to the
actual legislature's assessment, instead substituting its judgment on the
policy merits for Congress's. If Shelby County were anomalous, this
might not be notable, but the point is that it is fairly typical of what
happens in the public law domain.
The problem is exacerbated, of course, because the Supreme Court
selects its docket-it picks the cases it wants to hear, and unsurprisingly it
picks the cases where the federal circuits conflict or where the law is up
for grabs, up for grabs in precisely the sense that the rule of recognition
does not clearly settle what should be done. Of course, the Supreme
Court, having claimed for itself-without any basis in the constitutional
text-final authority to adjudicate constitutional questions two centuries
ago in Marbury v. Madison23 (one of the more successful revisions of the
American rule of recognition in our history), sometimes takes cases that
might appear settled, a clear indication that the Court intends to exercise
its super-legislative authority. Recall New York v. United States24 from
1992, one of the early cases 5 that signaled the intent of some members of
the super-legislature to redraw the boundaries of federal power after an
earlier super-legislature appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt
redrew them in the late 193os and early 1940S to make the New Deal
possible. New York concerned the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985, which the State of New York challenged as
betraying federalism values by violating state autonomy. Under what one
might have thought the controlling precedent, Garcia v. San Antonio
6
Metropolitan Transit Authority,2
just seven years earlier, New York
should have been an "easy" case, that is, one in which the law clearly
dictated that New York would lose. Garcia, which concerned federal
regulations about wages and working hours, held (or so it seemed at the
time!) that the only protection for federalism values, like state autonomy,
22.

Id. at 2632-33.

23. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

U.S. 144 (1992).
25. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,461 (199i).
26. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
24. 505
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came from the political process itself, that is from the fact that the states
were all represented in Congress; and only if there was a breakdown in
the political process, so the Garcia court suggested, would the Supreme
Court intervene. New York was a clear case from the standpoint of
Garcia: the Federal Radioactive Waste Management Act had been
enacted by Congress after being drafted by the various states. The states,
in effect, wanted Congress to bind them to the agreement they had reached
among themselves. This would seem to be a paradigmatic case of federalism
values in action: autonomous states strike a bargain about how to dispose of
their radioactive waste, and then ask Congress to enforce the bargain.
Once the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the matter everyone was on notice, of course, that the superlegislature planned to act. And act it did: in its majority opinion, Justice
O'Connor took a page from the great American Legal Realist Karl
Llewellyn's explanation of the malleability of precedent from his 1930
book The Bramble Bush." In Llewellyn's famous rendering, appellate
courts approach precedents in one of two ways: they read "unwelcome"
precedent strictly; that is, they characterize their holding in a way that is
highly specific to the facts of the earlier case in order to distinguish it
from the case currently before the court. In Llewellyn's obviously
facetious example, a strict reading of an earlier court's holding might be,
"This rule holds only of redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick
cars."29 By contrast, a "loose" reading of a precedent abstracts away from
the particular facts of the case in favor of a generic rule of law that the
court would like to treat as binding in the present instance. Not every
"strict" or "loose" reading is going to be plausible, but Llewellyn, as the
smart and experienced lawyer he was, is plainly correct that the doctrine
of precedent affords courts enough latitude in construing the holdings of
earlier cases to make precedent a feeble constraint on present decision in
many cases. And that is precisely what happened in New York.
Justice O'Connor, in the majority opinion, faced an obvious
problem as I mentioned: under Garcia, the Federal Radioactive Waste
Act looked like a clear case of the political process operating to protect
the interests of the states. After all, the states had drafted the Act in
negotiations with each other, and then asked Congress to enact it.
Presumably O'Connor lacked the votes to overrule Garcia-amove that
would have been unseemly, in any case, given that Garcia had overruled
another case, National League of Cities v. Usery,3 ° less than a decade
before! So, taking a page from Llewellyn's book, she set out to
distinguish Garcia by reading it strictly. According to Justice O'Connor's
27. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 68-71 (i ith prtg. 2008).

28. See id.
29. Id. at 68.
30. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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majority opinion,3 ' the rule in Garcia-therule that the only protection
for federalism values comes from the political process itself-applies
only in cases where the federal regulation applies to both public and
private entities, as was true of the wage and hour regulations at issue in
Garcia.In fact, Garcia itself did not make an issue out of this, but now,
seven years later in New York, Justice O'Connor did: for the Federal
Radioactive Waste Management Act applied only to public entities,
namely states, and so according to Justice O'Connor presented a different
issue than in Garcia. With Garcia distinguished, Justice O'Connor
proceeded into an historical analysis and ultimately invalidated a portion
of the Act.32 Those details do not matter for our purposes.
The dissenting opinion by Justice White33 also took a page from
Llewellyn: he effectively accused the majority of distinguishing Garciaon
the basis of factual differences that did not make a difference-in effect,
Justice White complained, the majority opinion said the rule in Garcia
applies only to "redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars."34
From Justice White's perspective, the difference between a federal
regulation that reached public and private entities as opposed to only
public ones was irrelevant, New York was an easy case, and Garcia
should have controlled the result.35
I want to be clear that I do not think either majority or dissent was
right "as a matter of law" in this case. To be sure, Justice O'Connor did a
poor job of explaining why the factual difference between Garcia and
New York actually mattered, but an explanation is not hard to come by:
surely it is not crazy to think state autonomy might be more at risk when
a federal regulation only applies to the states, as opposed to regulating
public and private actors equally. At the same time, Justice White's view
was equally plausible as a matter of law: the Garcia rule emphasized the
importance of the political process as a safeguard for state autonomy,
and the underlying facts in New York seemed to indicate a political
process functioning well, and indeed, driven by the states themselves,
until the state of New York had some buyer's remorse.
If the preceding is correct, then we should ask what really happened
in New York. The case, as students of federalism know, was near the
beginning of a series of Supreme Court cases in which, for the first time
since the triumph of the New Deal, the Court began placing some limits
on the exercise of federal power. President Reagan, who appointed
Justice O'Connor a decade earlier, ran partly on this issue, the issue of
state autonomy from federal overreach. And so, for Justice O'Connor, a
31. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149-88 (1992).
32. Id. at 155.
33. Id. at 188-211.
34. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 27, at 68.
35. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188-211.
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new-fangled conservative in the Reagan mold, New York presented an
opportunity to state loud and clear that there really are limits on federal
power. By contrast, for Justice White, an old-fangled conservative,
appointed by President Kennedy in the early I96os, the New Deal
revolution had settled all the questions about the scope of federal power.
Justice White was a law-and-order conservative, skeptical of the
expanding rights of criminal defendants, as well as of abortion rights, but
he was fully accepting of the transformation of the constitutional system
created by the New Deal. The federal legislature voted to bind the states
to a proposal for disposing radioactive waste that they themselves had
drafted; in New York, the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court
voted to overturn part of that plan. In doing so, they did not act as the
law requires: only a na'f could believe that. Instead, they exercised moral
and political judgment, and acted accordingly.
Let us now fast forward to the present, last term's decision in
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby?6 In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court upheld
a challenge by closely held corporations to a requirement of the
Affordable Care Act-more precisely, the mandate imposed by the
Department of Health and Human Services under that Act-that
employers (of a certain size) pay for employee health insurance that
covers, among other things, four kinds of (allegedly) post-conception
contraceptive drugs and devices. The challenge was based on the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), a 1993 law that
attempted to restore the constitutional protections for "free exercise" of
religion that had existed prior to Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Employment Division v. Smith.37 That 199o decision held that the state
need not grant religious exemptions for neutral laws of general
applicability-neutral in the sense that their purpose was not (facially or
otherwise) to substantially burden a particular religious faith. 8 Thus, under
Smith, the federal government did not need to find a less burdensome
alternative to a law that imposed incidental but substantial burdens on
free exercise of religion.
The Hobby Lobby decision found, plausibly, that the owners of the
closely held corporations challenging the mandate genuinely believed
that life begins at conception, so that they genuinely believed that postconception contraception was akin to murder.39 I want to emphasize that
three aspects of the Hobby Lobby decision seem to me fairly banal,
given the existence of RFRA: First, that the free exercise of religion of a

36. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
37. 494 U.S. 872, 874-90 (1990). Congress, and many states, reacted against this decision, and
Congress subsequently passed RFRA, which now prohibits the federal government from substantially
burdening religion when alternatives are available.
38. Id. at 882.
39. Hobby Lobby, 13 4 S. Ct. at 2764-66, 2775.
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closely held corporation is not meaningfully distinguishable from the free
exercise of religion by the individuals who closely own the corporation
(in other words, closely held corporations are "persons" for purposes of
RFRA). Second, that since the federal government had already provided
an opt-out provision from the mandate for nonprofit entities with
religious objections (like the University of Notre Dame), one that did not
shift costs to the employees seeking contraceptive coverage, then it was
clear that there were regulatory alternatives available to the federal
government to insure that contraception was available to female
employees that did not impose a substantial burden on religious belief.
And third, that under our constitutional regime of religious liberty,
courts must take seriously someone's religious belief that life begins at
conception. I, myself, disagree with this latter aspect of our constitutional
system, just as I also think RFRA is a bad law,4' but that is not at issue in
my doubts about Hobby Lobby. My doubts lie elsewhere.
The crucial legal question presented in Hobby Lobby, granting the
points I have just conceded, is whether requiring a closely held
corporation to pay for health insurance that an employee might use to
access medical services of which her employer disapproves constitutes a
"substantial burden" on the free exercise of the employer's religion in a
society which is not a theocracy, that is, in a society in which, for
example, employees need not subscribe to the religion of their employers.
The idea that it would constitute a substantial burden ought to have
seemed preposterous on its face. Yet in the majority opinion of the
super-legislature by Justice Alito, we are told that the belief of the owners
of the closely held corporations of paying for insurance which their
employees could use to secure contraceptive services that the employers
disapproved of "implicates a difficult and important question of religion
and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong
for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the
effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another."4' It is not for the courts, Justice Alito asserts, to tell "the
plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed."42 The job of the courts is only to
determine whether the beliefs are sincere religious beliefs, which everyone,
including me, grants that they are.
This sounds reasonable until one considers a scenario in which the
religious plaintiffs profess the following putatively religious belief: "This
law substantially burdens our free exercise of religion." That looks rather
like a legal conclusion masquerading as a religious belief, but now we
need to ask how such a scenario is any different from the position of the
40. See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE
liberty for special legal protections).
41. Hobby Lobby, 13 4 S. Ct. at 2778.
42.

Id.
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challengers in Hobby Lobby? If you believe that paying for medical
insurance that can be used by your employees to access medical procedures
of which you disapprove violates your free exercise rights, that is a legal
question for the courts. The courts can grant that you really believe this,
indeed, that you hold a particular philosophical or religious view about
"the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act
that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating
the commission of an immoral act by another."43 But calling it a
"philosophical" or religious view does not change the fact that it states a
legal conclusion, specifically, that the law requiring you to pay for the
medical insurance substantially burdens your religion.
In short, we can agree with Justice Alito that the Supreme Court has
long held that it will not adjudicate whether religious beliefs are sensible,
only whether they are religious and sincerely held. But that does not
mean that the courts must defer to the religious person's beliefs about
whether the law substantially burdens their religion: that has to be a legal
question for the courts, or the courts are out of business. The superlegislature should have acted like an actual court and found there was no
"substantial burden" on Hobby Lobby."
It is important to notice that the mistake in Justice Alito's reasoning
was, in fact, a legal mistake, not in the sense that he failed to recognize
the relevant sources of law but in the sense that he failed to understand
the conceptual or logical entailments from those sources. More precisely,
Justice Alito failed to correctly distinguish the legal question whether a
particular law actually imposes a "substantial burden" on religious exercise
from the non-legal question that courts are not supposed to adjudicate,
namely, whether claimant's religious beliefs are reasonable. If it were
really the case that courts must defer to the claimant's allegedly religious
beliefs about substantial burdens-that is, about whether their legal rights
are violated-then there is nothing for the courts to do. Since that is
absurd, Justice Alito obviously made a serious mistake in his legal reasoning.
Even if the super-legislature's mistake in Hobby Lobby was a legal
mistake, it still calls attention again to the importance of moral and
political judgment by the members of this super-legislature, since their
moral and political values may explain their propensity to make certain
kinds of mistakes. Remember that the Supreme Court, two hundred
years ago in Marbury v. Madison, successfully claimed for itself the
power to settle constitutional questions, meaning that the actual
legislature cannot easily undo the mistakes that are motivated by the
moral and political beliefs of the Justices-in this case, the desire of the
conservative majority of the super-legislature to signal their fundamental

43. See id.
44. Justice Ginsburg makes this point in dissent. Id. at 2798.
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sympathy with religious conservatives. To be sure, Hobby Lobby concerns
RFRA, not the First Amendment, though RFRA was, at a minimum,
purporting to re-establish an earlier constitutional regime. But it is a
reasonable prediction that Congress will not revisit RFRA to undo the
Hobby Lobby decision. Thus, even the plain legal mistakes of the superlegislature give us further reason to want to know the moral and political
views of the Justices before they are appointed, since those views will
illuminate precisely the domains in which they are likely to make errors.
Alas, the only people who are led to believe that Supreme Court
Justices are appointed based simply on their legal skill and knowledge
are the American people, meaning the electorate.45 Every American
president, from at least Roosevelt to Reagan to the present, understands
that the Supreme Court often acts as a super-legislature, and therefore
one had better try to appoint legislators, that is, Justices, who share the
moral and political views of the appointing president. Let me share an
amusing, but revealing, story my colleague, Judge Posner, told me-and
which he has shared with many others so I am not betraying any secrets
here. Judge Posner was appointed to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in 1981 when, as he said to my jurisprudence class one
year, people didn't realize President Reagan was "stacking" the courts
with "right-wingers like me." Those are Judge Posner's words, though as
all lawyers know, he has proven to be far less of a right-winger than the
current Republican Party might have hoped. In any case, Judge Posner's
point was that the media did not pay much attention to Senate
confirmation hearings then. Judge Posner's hearing was presided over by
Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, even then, in the early
i98os, a nearly octogenarian segregationist trying to pass as a member of
the modern world. Senator Thurmond, reading from his prepared script,
asked, "Do you agree that judges should just apply the law; they
shouldn't make the law?" 6 Judge Posner, being a smart lawyer and
scholar, explained that the choice was a false one: appellate courts are
repeatedly asked to decide cases in which the law is not settled-that is
one reason the cases are litigated through the stage of appellate review,
after all-and in those cases, the courts must provide authoritative

45. The public is not wholly ignorant, to be sure. A CBS News poll in 2012 found that threequarters of Americans believe that Supreme Court Justices "sometimes let their own personal or
political views influence their decisions." See Supreme Court/Judiciary,POLLINGREPORT.COM,
http://www.pollingreport.com/court.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2015). The Public Religion Institute in
2013 found that fifty-five percent of those surveyed thought Supreme Court Justices were influenced
by their own political views "a lot," while thirty-two percent thought they were influenced only "a
little," and eight percent "not at all." Id. Despite these suspicions, when Supreme Court Justices are
confirmed by the Senate, inquiry into their personal or political views is treated as off-limits. (Thanks
to Mike Seidman for help on this topic).
46. See Christopher Shea, The Last Honest Judicial Hearing? WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:19

PM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/ideas-market/2o 1/09/2 i/the-last-honest-judicial-hearingl.
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resolution, essential to a civilized society. So, of course, appellate judges
must sometimes make new law, since no legislature-as Hart observed a
half-century ago-could possibly anticipate all the problems that will
arise. In other words, appellate judges must exercise moral and political
judgment, an unavoidable part of their job. Senator Thurmond, already
well into his dotage, did not respond to the actual answer, but moved on
to the next question in his script. Now we come to the punch line of this
curious story: when Judge Posner received the transcript of his
confirmation hearing several weeks later, Senator Thurmond's initial
question was correctly recorded, namely, "Do you agree that judges
should just apply the law; they shouldn't make the law?"4' 7 But instead of
Judge Posner's actual answer, the transcript read that Judge Posner simply
replied, "Yes.""4
Now this is America in 1981, not Stalinist Russia. Yet a federal
judicial nominee's actual answer to a silly question by a political hack was
erased from the historical record in order to comport with the political
agenda of a President-Ronald Reagan-who liked to claim that he only
wanted to appoint judges who apply the law, rather than make the law.
But President Reagan and his advisors knew this was nonsense, just like
Judge Posner. They knew that appellate judges must inevitably exercise
moral and political judgment beyond the issues settled by the law in
order to resolve the actual disputes that come before the appellate courts.
How, in a democratic society, can such secrecy be justified?
In my view, it cannot. We should tell the truth to the electorate:
lawmakers cannot anticipate all problems that will arise, but in a civilized
society, we need courts to provide authoritative resolutions of disputes
that are left unsettled by the existing sources of law. Courts play that
role, and the "higher" the court, the more likely it is that court will be
asked to exercise circumscribed moral and political judgment, akin to
what we expect from honest legislators, assuming that term is not an
oxymoron in America these days. Therefore, when such judges are to be
appointed, the nominal representatives of the people should evaluate the
quality of moral and political judgment the nominee would exercise. Will
the nominee reflexively side with markets against state regulation, with
majorities against minorities, with the religious against the non-religious,
with color-blindness against sensitivity to the pernicious role of race in
society, with the police against criminal defendants, with the current
ideological fixations of the Republican Party against the current
ideological fixations of the Democratic Party? Is the nominee sensitive to
injustice, to the powerless, to the losers in the political process, or does
she side reflexively with those in power, with the status quo? These

47. Id.

48. See id.
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questions should be central to the confirmation process of members of
the super-legislature-or rather, they should be central in public to that
process, since they are obviously central to the actual nominators. They
are also, to be sure, the subject of speculation, rumors, and gossip, but
that is not the same as making them central to the actual proceedings in
which the Senate confirms a nominee. There are, certainly, many issues
in which legal expertise is essential, but there is no shortage of candidates
with the requisite expertise to parse technical points of law and it is rare
indeed that a president puts forward a candidate for the super-legislature
lacking that competence. What is not rare, unfortunately, is for
presidents to put forward candidates for the super-legislature whom they
choose based on their moral and political views, but then fail to
acknowledge that fact to the rest of the polity, and indeed, to object when
the Senate even asks about those views.
There is, one must acknowledge, a genuine worry about
encouraging candor on these matters. The worry, simply put, is that it
will embolden judges to overreach the legal limits even more than they
already do. Perhaps so, but the status quo is that elected officials appoint
super-legislators because of their moral and political views, but no one is
permitted to discuss that fact in public. If, in fact, we had a public
discussion of what all the insiders know-namely, that appellate judges
at the highest levels must exercise moral and political judgment-then
perhaps those judges who actually survive the process will be those
whose moral and political judgments comport more closely with those of
the polity at large.49 A polity that might welcome a liberal one decade
might not welcome her a decade later, and so that is yet another reason
to abolish lifetime tenure for federal judges in favor of fixed term
appointments, as other scholars have proposed." But even before that
happens, I do not see how, in a democratic society where transparency in
the exercise of public power (outside a select realm of areas, such as
national security) is a fundamental value, we can continue to tolerate the
current charade of nominating lawyers to the Supreme Court without
vetting, fully and in public, their moral and political views. Those crucial
views will determine their decisions in a range of momentous constitutional
matters, and sometimes not only there.

49. I assume for the sake of argument that majority approval suffices to "legitimate" the moral
and political views of the judges. For independent reasons, this strikes me as dubious, but that would
require a separate argument.
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